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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to firmly establish subjective fiducial inference as a rival
to the more conventional schools of statistical inference, and to show that Fisher’s intuition
concerning the importance of the fiducial argument was correct. In this regard, a methodology
outlined in an earlier paper is modified, enhanced and extended to deal with general inferential
problems in which various parameters are unknown. As part of this, an analytical method
or the Gibbs sampler is used to construct the joint fiducial distribution of all the parameters
of the model concerned on the basis of first determining the full conditional fiducial distribu-
tions for these parameters. Although the resulting theory is classified as being ‘subjective’, it
is maintained that this is simply due to the argument that all probability statements made
about fixed but unknown parameters must be inherently subjective. In particular, a systematic
framework is used to reason that, in general, there is no need to place a great emphasis on the
difference between the fiducial probabilities that can be derived using this theory and objective
probabilities. Some important examples of the application of this theory are presented.
Keywords: Data generating algorithm; Fiducial statistic; Full conditional fiducial distribu-
tions; Gibbs sampler; Primary random variable; Strength of probabilities.
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1. Introduction
R. A. Fisher is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, statistician that has ever lived.
Many of his contributions to statistical theory were considered to be revolutionary, but
one concept that he developed and discussed at length, namely the fiducial argument, has
as yet failed to gain many advocates. It is clear from his writings on the subject (see for
example Fisher 1930, 1935, 1956) that he regarded this concept as being the foundation
of a school of inference to rival the other two main schools of inference that still flourish to
this day, that is Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian inference. However, since Fisher’s death
in 1962, few have attempted to develop the fiducial argument into a separate school of
inference, notable exceptions being the work of D. A. S. Fraser on structural inference,
see Fraser (1966, 1972), and the theory contained in Wilkinson (1977).
There has been more activity, on the other hand, in attempting to use the fidu-
cial argument to support other schools of inference. In particular it has been used
to support Dempster-Shafer theory, see Dempster (1968) and Shafer (1976), and the
Neyman-Pearson school of inference by means of both generalized fiducial inference, see
Hannig (2009) and Hannig et al. (2016), and confidence distribution theory, see Xie and
Singh (2013). Also it can be viewed as supporting the theories of Dempster-Shafer and
Neyman-Pearson simultaneously as part of the recently developed theory of inferential
models, see Martin and Liu (2015).
Nevertheless, for those who respect the intellect and intuition of Fisher, it may be
disappointing to see that one of his most cherished theories has been reduced to only
a subsidiary role in theories that have quite a distinct aim from what he had in mind.
Furthermore, the same people may be surprised by the fact that, even to this day, it is
often argued that fiducial inference is so closely related to Bayesian inference that if, as
in many cases, the fiducial distribution is equal to the posterior distribution for some
choice of the prior distribution then the two theories are indistinguishable, see Lecoutre
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and Poitevineau (2014) and Liu and Martin (2015) and the work of many others. In
summary, it could be rather colourfully said that, in recent years, fiducial inference has
been like the wreck of a vintage car, which finds itself parked in a backstreet, sprayed with
graffiti by youths who do not appreciate its uniqueness and inner beauty, and robbed by
opportunists for spare parts to use in vehicles considered to be more commercially viable.
Following on from Bowater (2017b), the aim of the present paper is to attempt to
address this sorry state of affairs. In particular, the theory of subjective fiducial inference
presented in Bowater (2017b) will be modified, enhanced and extended to deal with
general inferential problems in which various parameters are unknown.
Let us briefly outline the structure of the paper. A motivation for the theory is given
in the following section and the concept of probability that will be used is explained in
Section 3. After introducing some key definitions and proposing some useful procedures
in Section 4, the resulting methodology is applied to various examples in Section 5. The
specification of the conceptual framework is then completed in Section 6. The final two
sections of the paper clarify the merits of the theory and discuss some open issues.
2. Motivation
The need for an alternative theory of inference is motivated by the inadequacies of es-
tablished theories in addressing the issue of how to make inferences on the basis of data
when nothing or little was known about the parameters of interest before the data was
observed. Here we will briefly review the inadequacies of two such theories with regard to
how they tackle this issue, namely objective Bayesian inference and frequentist post-data
inference.
Objective Bayesian inference is a form of Bayesian inference that is based on prior
distributions that have the property that the information contained within them has in
some way been minimised, either explicitly or implicitly, compared to the information
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that is expected to be contained in the data. Advocates of this type of inference would
argue that it offers a collection of methods that attempt to standardise the way in which
a prior distribution can be formed that, through the posterior distribution, allows the
data to ‘speak for themselves’. However, objective Bayesian inference faces the following
severe criticisms:
1) If an objective Bayesian analysis is to avoid that inferences are dependent on the way
the sampling model is parameterised, which was a drawback of the classical Bayesian
methods based on the principle of insufficient reason that were proposed by both T.
Bayes and P. S. Laplace, then the choice of prior will need to depend on the sampling
model, as is the case in the methods that can be found for example in Jeffreys (1961),
Kass and Wasserman (1996) and Ghosh (2011). However, as highlighted by many (see for
example Seidenfeld 1979 and Lindley 1997), this completely breaks the logic of Bayesian
theory as our state of knowledge about a parameter will depend on how we intend to go
about collecting more information about the parameter.
2) Priors derived using objective Bayesian methods are very often improper. Such priors
break the standard rules of probability without any special permission for doing so, and
are therefore purely mathematical creations that have no direct real-world meaning.
3) Even taking into account the principle of stable estimation (see Edwards, Lindman
and Savage 1963) and even when the sample size is large, posterior distributions will be
generally very sensitive to differences in the priors that are derived by different objective
Bayesian methods. Therefore, it is vital that there is a consensus on which objective
Bayesian method is the best one to use, but such a consensus does not exist. Some
methods even lead to different priors depending on what is the parameter of main interest,
e.g. the method outlined in Bernardo (1979) and Berger and Bernardo (1992).
Let us now consider frequentist post-data inference, which we will assume refers
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to the type of conditional frequentist approaches to inference outlined in Goutis and
Casella (1995). The motivation for these methods clearly stems from the difficulties that
arose from Fisher’s attempt to justify the fiducial argument in terms of frequentist prob-
ability. The reason that he chose to do this would seem to have come from a desire to
place the fiducial argument on an objective footing and, in terms of quantifying uncer-
tainty, objectivity for Fisher meant frequentist probability. To be more specific, the crux
of Fisher’s line of reasoning (as it is presented in Fisher 1956) was that a fiducial interval
for a parameter can only be valid in a frequentist sense if the sample space contains no
subsets that are recognisable with respect to this interval. However, Buehler and Fed-
dersen (1963) showed that even in one of the simplest and most common problems of
inference, that of making inferences about the mean µ of a normal distribution when its
variance σ2 is unknown, recognisable subsets exist with respect to the standard fiducial
interval for µ. To this day, the ubiquity of recognisable subsets in proposed solutions
to problems of inference represents a major obstacle to the further development of the
theory of frequentist post-data inference.
3. A note about probability
Let us begin by establishing the concept of probability that will be used in this paper.
We observe that it would be difficult to argue that subjective probability is a meaningless
concept. The fact that a meteorological expert can say that he believes the probability of
rain tomorrow is 0.3 and others find this information useful would seem to satisfactorily
refute such an argument. Some would argue that subjective probability is the only
concept of probability that is required, such that distinctions between different types of
probability is essentially pointless. Such a view is common amongst advocates of the
Bayesian paradigm, see for example, de Finetti (1974, 1975) and Savage (1954).
Perhaps the most standard position to take on whether probabilities are of different
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types is to contend that two types of probability exist, one being subjective probability
based on some kind of elicitation method, and the other being frequentist probability
based on calculating the long run proportion of times a repeatable experiment produces
a given outcome. In this viewpoint, it would appear that the value that is assigned as the
probability of any given event is not sufficient to fully define the probability concerned
as we also need to know whether the probability is subjective or frequentist. Also,
the prevalence of this viewpoint naturally gives importance to the Bayesian frequentist
controversy, which arises due to the fact that, according to given criteria, inferences
made using the Bayesian approach often conflict with inferences made using the Neyman-
Pearson (frequentist) approach.
This paper will rely on the definition of probability originally presented in Bowa-
ter (2017a), where it was referred to as type B probability, which was subsequently ex-
tended to probability distributions in Bowater (2017b). Under this definition, probability
comprises of two components, namely a probability value, which is the sole recognised
component in conventional definitions of probability, and the strength assigned to this
probability value. Therefore, probabilities can be big and weak, small and strong, big
and strong, small and weak etc. The strength component allows an ordered classification
of probability types, and therefore is more sophisticated than the standard dichotomous
system of classifying probabilities as simply being subjective or frequentist. For a full
definition and explanation of this concept of probability, the reader is referred to the two
aforementioned papers. Nevertheless, to summarise how this definition of probability can
be used to determine a probability value and its strength for a single event, a modified
version of an example that appears in Bowater (2017a) will now be presented.
Let us suppose that an individual wishes to determine his probability for the event of
a first-term US president being reelected in three years’ time, which will be referred to
as the event A. From the earlier papers, it can be seen that we must first decide upon a
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reference set of events R = {R1, R2, . . . , Rk}. Taking into account the likely precision by
which he may be able to determine his probability value for the event A, let us imagine
that the individual decides that the events Ri correspond to each of the outcomes of
drawing a ball from an urn of 20 distinctly labelled balls. With the event R(λ) defined
by substituting k = 20 into the general definition of this event, i.e.
R(λ) =
{
R1 ∪R2 ∪ · · · ∪Rλk if λ ∈ {Λ, 1}
∅ if λ = 0 (1)
where Λ = {1/k, 2/k, . . . , (k − 1)/k}, his probability value for the event A is then
defined as being the unique value of λ ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.1, . . . , 1} that maximises the similarity
S(A,R(λ)), i.e. the similarity between his conviction that the event A will occur and his
conviction that the event R(λ) will occur. Let us assume that this value is 0.7. Therefore,
it is being assumed that the individual is capable of asserting that, in his opinion, the
similarities S(A,R(0.65)) and S(A,R(0.75)) are less than the similarity S(A,R(0.7)),
which seems a reasonable assumption to make.
Now let us consider an event associated with spinning what is known as a probability
wheel (see Spetzler and Stael von Holstein 1975) which consists essentially of a rotatable
disc with a fixed pointer in its centre. Assuming that the area of the disc is divided into
a red sector and a blue sector, let the event of interest be the event of the pointer coming
to rest in the red sector, which will be referred to as the event B. If the proportion of the
area of the disc that is red is 0.7, then using the definition of probability being considered
it would not be at all surprising if, with respect to the aforementioned reference set R,
the individual assigned a probability value of 0.7 to the event B.
However, although a probability value of 0.7 has been assigned to both the events A
and B, the strength that is associated with this probability value when it is assigned
to event A is likely to be different from when it is assigned to event B, even under the
assumption that the probability value for the event A has been determined as precisely
as possible. In particular, it is likely that the similarity S(A,R(0.7)) will be considered
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to be substantially less than the similarity S(B,R(0.7)), which is equivalent to asserting
that the probability of 0.7 is a much weaker probability for the event A than for the event
B. The reason for this should be fairly evident, since the nature of the uncertainty about
whether event A will occur is clearly different from the nature of the uncertainty about
both whether event R(0.7) will occur and whether event B will occur. More specifically,
the factors that can influence whether or not event A will occur are likely to be considered
vague and difficult to weigh up, while events R(0.7) and B, on the other hand, are the
outcomes of two standard types of physical experiment.
The idea that a probability comprises of both a probability value and its strength
is supported by the need to explain the expression of ambiguity aversion in decision
making, which is an issue that has been long debated in microeconomic theory (see
Ellsberg 1961, Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989 and Alary, Gollier and Treich 2013). In this
regard, the definition of probability being considered has been used to undermine the
independence axiom upon which the foundations of Bayesian theory depend, since it
facilitates a rational explanation of the paradox associated with Ellsberg’s three colour
example (see Ellsberg 1961 for the example and Bowater 2017a for the explanation).
Therefore, this counters the popular argument that any measure of the uncertainty of an
event that is not solely the probability value assigned to the event must be invalid due
to the measure not being compatible with Bayesian theory.
The concept of strength can be applied not just to individual probabilities but also to
entire probability density functions in the sense that, under additional criteria, one den-
sity function can be classified as being weaker or stronger than another density function.
Loosely speaking, a probability density fX(x) is defined as being stronger than another
density gY (y) at the level of resolution α, if probabilities equal to α derived by integrat-
ing fX(x) over subspaces of x are considered to be at least as strong as, and sometimes
stronger than, probabilities equal to α derived by integrating fY (y) over subspaces of y.
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A more detailed definition of this property can be found in Bowater (2017b).
Although in the sections that immediately follow attention will be focused on the
determination of probability values and densities rather than on the determination of
their strengths, this latter issue needs to be borne in mind. We will explicitly return to
the task of completing probability definitions by assigning strengths to probability values
and densities in Section 6.
4. Subjective fiducial inference
4.1. Sampling model
In general, it will be assumed that a sampling model that depends on one or various
unknown parameters θ1, θ2, . . . , θk generates the data x. Let the joint density of the data
given the true values of θ1, θ2, . . . , θk be denoted as g(x | θ1, θ2, . . . , θk).
4.2. Univariate case
For the moment, we will assume that the only unknown parameter in the model is θ1,
either because there are no other parameters in the model, or because the true values of
the parameters θ2, . . . , θk are known.
Definition 1: Fiducial statistics
Given this assumption, a fiducial statistic Q(x) will be defined as being a one-dimensional
sufficient statistic for θ1 if such a statistic exists, otherwise it may be assumed to be any
one-to-one function of a unique maximum likelihood estimator of θ1.
Assumption 1: Data generating algorithm
Independent of the way in which the data were actually generated, it will be assumed
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that the data set x was generated by the following algorithm:
1) Generate a value γ for a continuous one-dimensional random variable Γ, which has a
probability density function fΓ(γ) that does not depend on the parameter θ1.
2) Determine a value q(x) for a fiducial statistic Q(x) by setting Γ equal to γ and q(x)
equal to Q(x) in the following definition of the distribution of Q(x):
Q(x) = ϕ(Γ, θ1) (2)
where the function ϕ(Γ, θ1) is defined so that it satisfies the following conditions:
Assumption 1.1: Conditions on the function ϕ(Γ, θ1)
a) The distribution of Q(x) as defined by equation (2) is equal to what it would have
been if Q(x) had been determined on the basis of the data set x.
b) The only random variable upon which ϕ(Γ, θ1) depends is the variable Γ.
c) Let G = {γ : fΓ(γ) > 0}, and let H1 be the set of all possible values of θ1 as specified
before any information about the data x has been obtained. If it is assumed that a value
for Q(x) has been generated, but both its corresponding value γ for the variable Γ and
the parameter θ1 are unknown, then substituting Q(x) in equation (2) by whatever value
is taken by Q(x) would imply that this equation would define an injective mapping from
the set G to the set H1.
3) Generate the data set x by conditioning the sampling density g(x | θ1, θ2, . . . , θk) on
the already generated value for Q(x).
In the context of the above algorithm, the variable Γ will be referred to as a primary
random variable (primary r.v.). However, if the above algorithm was rewritten so that
the value γ of the variable Γ was generated by setting it equal to a deterministic function
of an already generated value for Q(x) and the parameter θ1, then Γ would not be a
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primary r.v. In relation to Neyman-Pearson theory, a primary r.v. could be classified as
a type of pivot that is distinguished in terms of the way it is generated.
Definition 2: Univariate subjective fiducial distributions
Given a value q(x) for a fiducial statistic Q(x), the subjective fiducial distribution of
the parameter θ1 conditional on the parameters θ2, θ3, . . . , θk being known is defined by
setting Q(x) equal to q(x) in equation (2), and then treating the value θ1 as being a
realisation of the random variable Θ1, to give the expression:
q(x) = ϕ(Γ,Θ1) (3)
where Γ has the density function fΓ(γ) defined in step 1 of the data generating algorithm
in Assumption 1. This equation implies a valid probability distribution for the param-
eter θ1 under condition (c) of Assumption 1.1. Also, it can be easily shown that this
distribution for θ1 does not depend on the choice made for the fiducial statistic Q(x).
The classical fiducial argument can be seen through the fact that the distribution of the
primary r.v. Γ is the same both before and after the fiducial statistic q(x) is observed.
4.3. Multivariate case
We will now consider the case where all the parameters θ1, θ2, . . . , θk in the sampling
model are unknown.
For any given data set x, let us assume that the method outlined in the previous
section allows us to define the fiducial density of the parameter θj conditional on all
other parameters θ−j for all j = 1, 2, . . . , k. We will denote this set of full conditional
fiducial densities as
f(θj |θ−j, x) for j = 1, 2, . . . , k (4)
We know that if these conditional densities determine a joint distribution for the param-
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eters θ1, θ2, . . . , θk then this distribution must be unique.
Definition 3: Multivariate subjective fiducial distributions
Under the assumption that the conditional densities in equation (4) determine a joint
distribution for the parameters θ1, θ2, . . . , θk, we will define this latter distribution as
being the joint subjective fiducial distribution of these parameters. Let us denote the
corresponding joint density function as f(θ1, θ2, . . . , θk |x). It will not be assumed though
that this joint density or the set of conditional densities in equation (4) can necessarily
be expressed in analytic form.
It is clear that there are two principal difficulties with the application of the method
just described. First, we do not possess a universal theorem that states that the full con-
ditional densities in equation (4) always determine a joint distribution for θ1, θ2, . . . , θk.
Therefore, at the very least, we need some reassurance that it is appropriate to make this
assumption.
Second, it may be difficult to calculate the expected value of any given function of
interest h(θ1, θ2, . . . , θk) with respect to the joint fiducial density of θ1, θ2, . . . , θk, i.e.
calculate
E(h(θ1, θ2, . . . , θk) |x) =
∫
θ1
∫
θ2
· · ·
∫
θk
h(θ1, θ2, . . . , θk)f(θ1, θ2, . . . , θk |x)dθ1dθ2 . . . dθk
(5)
While this difficulty also arises with respect to posterior densities of various parameters
obtained using Bayesian inference, it would seem to be more acute in the case of subjective
fiducial inference. This is because such posterior densities can usually be expressed in
analytic form at least up to a normalising constant, whereas by contrast, in many of the
cases where this can be done, it will not be possible to obtain analytic expressions for
the corresponding joint fiducial densities up to a normalising constant.
In the sections that immediately follow we will propose two distinct ways of tackling
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the aforementioned difficulties.
4.4. An analytical method
Given the set of full conditional densities in equation (4), a way of establishing whether
they determine a joint distribution for θ1, θ2, . . . , θk is simply to propose such a distribu-
tion, calculate the full conditional distributions for the proposed joint distribution and
see if they match the full conditionals in equation (4). If they do, then this proves that a
joint fiducial distribution exists and it is equal to the proposed joint distribution. Since
joint fiducial densities are sometimes identical to joint posterior densities for a given
choice of joint prior for θ1, θ2, . . . , θk, a good proposal, up to a normalising constant, for
the joint fiducial density may often be found by multiplying the likelihood function by a
convenient mathematical choice for the joint prior density.
If a joint density for θ1, θ2, . . . , θk can be found that has full conditional densities
that match those in equation (4), the expected value in equation (5) could be determined
using analytic manipulation, or approximated using numerical integration or Monte Carlo
methods. Many methods that could be used would be identical or very similar to standard
methods that are used to calculate or approximate expected values of functions over joint
posterior densities.
Statement about incompatible full conditional distributions
It is not acknowledged in the following section or in Sections 5.4, 5.5, or 5.7 that the
stationary distribution of an ergodic Gibbs sampler is affected by the scanning order
of the variables on which the sampler is based when the full conditional distributions
concerned are incompatible. These sections will be rewritten in due course to take this
important issue into account. Nevertheless, doing so will not affect the relevance of the
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results that are currently presented in the examples in the latter three sections.
4.5. The Gibbs sampler and convergence analysis
If we simply made the assumption that the full conditional densities in equation (4)
determine a joint density for θ1, θ2, . . . , θk, then a natural way to try to generate random
values from this joint fiducial density, especially if the number of parameters k is large,
would be to look at applying the Gibbs sampler (Geman and Geman 1984 and Gelfand
and Smith 1990) to its already specified full conditional densities. As is the case in general
with this simulation method, it would work especially well if it is easy to sample from each
of these full conditional densities and the autocorrelation between successively generated
samples is low. Once a sufficiently large number m of random samples have been obtained
from the joint fiducial density of θ1, θ2, . . . , θk, the expectation in equation (5) could be
approximated using the Monte Carlo estimator
1
(m− b)
m∑
i=b+1
h(θ
(i)
1 , θ
(i)
2 , . . . , θ
(i)
k )
where θ
(i)
1 , θ
(i)
2 , . . . , θ
(i)
k is the ith sample of parameter values, and b is the number of initial
samples that have been classified as belonging to the burn-in phase of the sampler.
As is usual when applying Markov chain Monte Carlo methods, it is necessary to study
diagnostics of the samples produced by a Gibbs sampler to try to ascertain whether the
sampler converges to its unique stationary distribution before all its m cycles have been
completed. If it is felt that this is not the case then the standard alternative strategies
are available, e.g. the sampler could simply be run over a larger number of cycles or
different starting points for the sampler could be tried. It is well known that these kind
of strategies will be more effective in some situations than in others.
If the assumption that the full conditional densities in equation (4) determine a joint
distribution for θ1, θ2, . . . , θk is removed, then really only one additional complication is
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introduced. This is that, since the Gibbs sampler may not in fact have a stationary
distribution, it may not converge even over an infinite number of cycles. To compensate
for not being able to make the assumption that this stationary distribution exists, a
generally greater emphasis therefore needs to be placed on checking for convergence of the
sampler than when this assumption is beyond doubt, e.g. when sampling from a posterior
distribution that is known to be proper. The convergence checks and tests described in
Gelman and Rubin (1992), Cowles and Carlin (1996), and Brooks and Gelman (1998) and
variants on these methods would seem to be particularly appropriate for this purpose.
5. Applications to multivariate cases
This section will present applications of the methodology detailed in previous sections to
cases where more than one parameter is unknown.
5.1. Inference about a normal mean with variance unknown
To begin with, let us consider the standard problem of making inferences about the
mean µ of a normal distribution, when its variance σ2 is unknown, on the basis of a
sample x of size n, i.e. x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), drawn from the distribution concerned.
Although a solution to this problem using subjective fiducial inference was put forward
in Bowater (2017b), it should become clear when the conceptual framework is completed
in Section 6 that the approach outlined in the present paper provides a more elegant way
in which it can be resolved.
If σ2 is known, a sufficient statistic for µ is the sample mean x¯, which can therefore
be treated as being the fiducial statistic q(x). Defining the primary r.v. Γ as having a
standard normal distribution implies that equation (2) can be expressed as
x¯ = ϕ(Γ, µ) = µ+ (σ/
√
n)Γ
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meaning that, according to Definition 2, the fiducial distribution of µ is defined by
µ |σ2, x ∼ N(x¯, σ2/n) (6)
which is the standard fiducial distribution for µ in this problem. On the other hand, if
µ is known, a sufficient statistic for σ2 is the variance estimator
σˆ2 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(xi − µ)2 (7)
which will be treated as being q(x). Defining Γ as having a χ2 distribution with n degrees
of freedom implies that equation (2) can be expressed as
σˆ2 = ϕ(Γ, σ2) = (σ2/n)Γ
meaning that the fiducial distribution of σ2 is defined by
σ2 |µ, x ∼ Scale-inv-χ2(n, σˆ2) (8)
i.e. it is a scaled inverse χ2 distribution with n degrees of freedom and scaling parameter
equal to σˆ2, which again would be generally accepted as the standard fiducial distribution
for the problem concerned.
To verify that the full conditional distributions in equations (6) and (8) determine a
joint distribution for µ and σ2 we can use the analytical method outlined in Section 4.4.
In particular, the full conditional distributions of the joint proper posterior distribution
of µ and σ2 that corresponds to choosing the prior density of µ and σ2 to be the improper
density p(µ, σ2) ∝ 1/σ2 are identical to the full conditionals in equations (6) and (8).
Therefore, the conditional distributions in these equations determine a joint fiducial dis-
tribution for µ and σ2 and by integrating over this joint distribution, it can be established
that the marginal fiducial distribution for µ is defined by
µ |x ∼ tn−1(x¯, s/
√
n)
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where s is the sample standard deviation, i.e. it is the familiar non-standardised Student
t distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom, location parameter equal to x¯ and scaling
parameter equal to s/
√
n, which again is the standard fiducial distribution for the case
in question.
5.2. Inference about both parameters of a Pareto distribution
Let us now consider the problem of making inferences about both the shape parameter
α and the scale parameter β of a Pareto distribution on the basis of a sample x from the
density function concerned, i.e. the function
f(y |α, β) =
{
αβαy−(α+1) if y ≥ β
0 otherwise
If β is known, a sufficient statistic for α is
∑n
i=1 log xi, which will be treated as being the
fiducial statistic q(x). Defining the primary r.v. Γ as having a Gamma(n, 1) distribution,
i.e. a gamma distribution with shape n and rate 1, implies that equation (2) can be
expressed as
n∑
i=1
log xi = ϕ(Γ, α) = (Γ/α) + n log β
meaning that, according to Definition 2, the fiducial distribution of α is defined by
α | β, x ∼ Gamma
(
n,
n∑
i=1
(log xi − log β)
)
(9)
On the other hand, if α is known, a sufficient statistic for β is the minimum value of
the sample, i.e. min(x), which will be treated as being q(x). Defining Γ as having an
exponential distribution with rate equal to 1, implies that equation (2) can be expressed
as
min(x) = ϕ(Γ, β) = exp((Γ/nα) + log β)
meaning that the fiducial density of β is
f(β |α, x) =
{
(nα/β) exp(−nα(log(min(x))− log β)) if β > 0
0 otherwise
(10)
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The full conditional distributions of the joint proper posterior distribution of α and
β that corresponds to choosing the prior density of α and β to be the improper density
p(α, β) ∝ (αβ)−1 are identical to the full conditionals in equations (9) and (10). There-
fore, the conditional distributions in these equations determine a joint fiducial density
for α and β, which is defined by
f(α, β |x) ∝ αn−1βnα−1
n∏
i=1
x
−(α+1)
i
5.3. Inference about all parameters of a normal quadratic regression model
To show how the approach outlined in Section 4 can be applied to normal polynomial
regression models, let us consider the example of applying this approach to the problem
of making inferences about all the parameters β0, β1, β2 and σ
2 of a normal quadratic
regression model, i.e.
yi = β0 + β1xi + β2x
2
i + ε ε ∼ N(0, σ2)
on the basis of a sample y+ = {(xi, yi) : i = 1, 2, . . . , n} from the model concerned.
Sufficient statistics for each of the parameters β0, β1, β2 and σ
2 conditional on all
parameters except the parameter itself being known are respectively
n∑
i=1
yi,
n∑
i=1
xiyi,
n∑
i=1
x2i yi and
n∑
i=1
(yi − β0 − β1xi − β2x2i )2
which would therefore be suitable fiducial statistics q(y+). By applying the methodology
described in Section 4 to each of these fiducial statistics, it can be shown that the full
conditional fiducial distributions for this problem are defined by:
β0 | β1, β2, σ2, y+ ∼ N
(
n∑
i=1
yi/n− β1
n∑
i=1
xi/n− β2
n∑
i=1
x2i /n, σ
2/n
)
(11)
β1 | β0, β2, σ2, y+ ∼ N
(
n∑
i=1
xiyi/
n∑
i=1
x2i − β0
n∑
i=1
xi/
n∑
i=1
x2i − β2
n∑
i=1
x3i /
n∑
i=1
x2i , σ
2/
n∑
i=1
x2i
)
(12)
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β2 | β0, β1, σ2, y+ ∼ N
(
n∑
i=1
x2i yi/
n∑
i=1
x4i − β0
n∑
i=1
x2i /
n∑
i=1
x4i − β1
n∑
i=1
x3i /
n∑
i=1
x4i , σ
2/
n∑
i=1
x4i
)
(13)
σ2 | β0, β1, β2, y+ ∼ Scale-inv-χ2
(
n,
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − β0 − β1xi − β2x2i )2
)
(14)
The full conditional distributions of the joint proper posterior distribution of β0, β1,
β2 and σ
2 that corresponds to choosing the joint prior density of these parameters to
be the improper density p(β0, β1, β2, σ
2) ∝ 1/σ2 are identical to the full conditionals in
equations (11) to (14). Therefore, the conditional distributions in these equations deter-
mine a joint fiducial density for β0, β1, β2 and σ
2, which is defined by
f(β0, β1, β2, σ
2 | y+) ∝ σ−(n+2) exp
(
−1
2
n∑
i=1
(
yi − β0 − β1xi − β2x2i
σ
)2)
5.4. Inference about both parameters of a gamma distribution
We will now consider the problem of making inferences about both the shape parameter
α and the rate parameter β of a gamma distribution on the basis of a sample x from the
density function concerned, i.e. the function
f(y |α, β) = β
αyα−1 exp(−yβ)
G(α)
if y ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise
where G(α) is the gamma function evaluated at α.
If α is known, a sufficient statistic for β is
∑n
i=1 xi, which will be treated as being the
fiducial statistic q(x). Defining the primary r.v. Γ as having a Gamma(nα, 1) distribution,
implies that equation (2) can be expressed as:
n∑
i=1
xi = ϕ(Γ, β) = Γ/β
meaning that the fiducial distribution of β is defined by
β |α, x ∼ Gamma
(
nα,
n∑
i=1
xi
)
(15)
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On the other hand, if β is known, a sufficient statistic for α is
∑n
i=1 log xi, which will
be treated as being q(x). However, defining the primary r.v. Γ and the required function
ϕ(Γ, α) in equation (2) is not straightforward in this case. This is due to the cumulative
density function of
∑n
i=1 log xi not being mathematically very tractable. A rudimentary
way of approximating the distribution of
∑
log xi is to use the central limit theorem.
This is the approximation method that will be adopted here.
It can be shown that the mean and variance of
∑
log xi are n(ψ(α)− log β) and nψ′(α)
respectively, where ψ(α) and ψ
′
(α) are respectively the digamma and trigamma functions
evaluated at α. Therefore, assuming that
∑
log xi is approximately normally distributed,
equation (2) can be approximated by
n∑
i=1
log xi = ϕ(Γ, α) = n(ψ(α)− log β) + Γ
√
nψ′(α) (16)
where Γ is defined as having a N(0, 1) distribution. If n is sufficiently large then, given
a fixed value of
∑
log xi, this equation defines an injective mapping from subsets of
values γ for the variable Γ to the space of α except when these subsets of γ values
contain extremely positive or negative numbers. Therefore, the function ϕ(Γ, α) in this
equation approximately satisfies condition (c) of Assumption 1.1, and as a result, under
Definition 2, this equation approximately defines the fiducial distribution of α conditional
on β being known.
Figure 1 shows the results of running a Gibbs sampler on the basis of the conditional
fiducial distributions for β given α and for α given β defined by equations (15) and (16)
respectively. The data set x was a random sample of n = 20 values from a gamma
distribution with α = 2 and β = 0.5. To generate each value from the fiducial distribution
for α defined by equation (16), a random value γ of the variable Γ was first drawn from
a N(0, 1) distribution truncated to lie in the interval [−5, 5] and then equation (16) was
numerically solved to find the corresponding value of α. Truncating the distribution of
Γ in the way just described meant that there was always an injective mapping from the
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space of possible values for γ to the space of α, i.e. condition (c) of Assumption 1.1 was
always satisfied.
Figures 1(a) and 1(c) show the progression of one run of 100,000 cycles of the Gibbs
sampler in terms of the parameters α and β respectively. The histograms in Figures 1(b)
and 1(d) were formed on the basis of all samples of α and β after the initial 500 samples,
which were classified as belonging to the burn-in phase of the sampler, had been removed.
The Gibbs sampler was run from various starting points, and a careful study of appro-
priate diagnostics corresponding to these runs provided no evidence to suggest that the
sampler was failing to converge, or was getting trapped in just one mode of a proper or
improper multimodal distribution. With reference to the comments made in Section 4.5,
it would therefore seem reasonably safe to assume that the conditional distributions de-
fined by equations (15) and (16) determine a joint fiducial distribution for α and β, and
that we have succeeded in obtaining a series of random samples from this distribution.
5.5. Inference about both parameters of a beta distribution
The next problem we will consider is that of making inferences about both parameters
α and β of a beta distribution on the basis of a sample x from the density function
concerned, i.e. the function
f(y |α, β) = y
α−1(1− y)β−1
B(α, β)
if 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, and 0 otherwise
where B(α, β) is the beta function evaluated at α and β.
If β is known, a sufficient statistic for α is
∑n
i=1 log xi, which will be treated as being
the fiducial statistic q(x). However, the cumulative density function of q(x) in this case
is again not mathematically very tractable. Therefore, similar to what was done in the
previous example, the central limit theorem will be used to approximate the distribution
of q(x).
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Figure 1: Gibbs sampling of the joint fiducial distribution of the parameters of a gamma
distribution
Using the same procedure as in Section 5.4, it follows that if
∑n
i=1 log xi is approxi-
mately normally distributed then equation (2) can be approximated by
n∑
i=1
log xi = ϕ(Γ, α) = n(ψ(α)− ψ(α + β)) + n1/2(ψ′(α)− ψ′(α + β))1/2Γ (17)
where Γ ∼ N(0, 1). If n is sufficiently large, then the function ϕ(Γ, α) in this equation
satisfies condition (c) of Assumption 1.1 under the restriction that values of γ that
are extremely positive or negative are excluded from the set G, and as a result, under
Definition 2, this equation approximately defines the fiducial distribution of α conditional
on β being known.
On the other hand, if α is known, a sufficient statistic for β is
∑n
i=1 log(1− xi), which
will be treated as being q(x). Since the cumulative density function of q(x) is again not
mathematically very tractable, the distribution of q(x) will be approximated on the basis
of the central limit theorem using the same procedure as was just described.
By proceeding in this way, it follows that if
∑n
i=1 log(1−xi) is approximately normally
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distributed then equation (2) can be approximated by
n∑
i=1
log(1− xi) = ϕ(Γ, β) = n(ψ(β)− ψ(α + β)) + n1/2(ψ′(β)− ψ′(α + β))1/2Γ (18)
where again Γ ∼ N(0, 1). As was the case before, the function ϕ(Γ, β) in this equation
approximately satisfies condition (c) of Assumption 1.1 and, as a result, under Defini-
tion 2, this equation approximately defines the fiducial distribution of β conditional on
α being known.
Figure 2 shows the results of running a Gibbs sampler on the basis of the full con-
ditional fiducial distributions defined by equations (17) and (18). This figure has been
constructed on the basis of one run of 100,000 cycles of this algorithm using the same cri-
teria as were used to construct Figure 1, with the data set x in question being a random
sample of n = 50 values from a beta distribution with α = 8 and β = 3. Random val-
ues were generated from the fiducial distributions for α and β defined by equations (17)
and (18) using the same numerical method that was used in Section 5.4 to generate values
from the fiducial distribution defined by equation (16).
The Gibbs sampler was run from various starting points and the results provided no
evidence to suggest that the sampler was failing to converge or was getting trapped in
just one mode of a proper or improper multimodal distribution. Hence, it would seem
reasonable to draw similar conclusions to that which were made in Section 5.4, and
thereby assume that the conditional distributions defined by equations (17) and (18)
determine a joint fiducial distribution for α and β.
5.6. The Behrens-Fisher problem
As a prelude to examining the general problem of making inferences about all the pa-
rameters of a bivariate normal distribution based on a data set consisting of realisations
of the two variables X and Y described by this distribution, let us consider the special
case of this problem in which the covariance of X and Y is assumed to be zero. The data
23
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Figure 2: Gibbs sampling of the joint fiducial distribution of the parameters of a beta
distribution
set will be assumed to comprise of a sample x of nx realisations of the variable X and
a sample y of ny realisations of the variable Y . Let µx and µy denote the means of the
variables X and Y respectively, and let the variances of X and Y be denoted by σ2x and
σ2y respectively.
On the basis of the results presented in Section 5.1, it is clear that the full conditional
fiducial distributions for this problem are defined by first substituting µx for µ, σ
2
x for σ
2
and nx for n into equations (6), (7) and (8) to obtain the conditional fiducial distributions
f(µx |µy, σ2x, σ2y, x, y) and f(σ2x |µx, µy, σ2y , x, y), and then by substituting µy for µ, σ2y for
σ2, ny for n and the sample y for the sample x into the same equations to get the
conditional fiducial distributions f(µy |µx, σ2x, σ2y, x, y) and f(σ2y |µx, µy, σ2x, x, y).
The full conditional distributions of the joint proper posterior distribution of µx, µy,
σ2x, σ
2
y that corresponds to choosing the prior density of µx, µy, σ
2
x, σ
2
y to be the improper
density p(µx, µy, σ
2
x, σ
2
y) ∝ 1/σ2xσ2y are identical to the full conditional fiducial distribu-
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tions for this problem. Therefore, these latter conditional distributions determine a joint
fiducial distribution for µx, µy, σ
2
x and σ
2
y, and on the basis of this joint distribution, it
can be established that the marginal fiducial distribution for µx − µy is defined by
µx − µy = x¯− y¯ +B
√
s2x
nx
+
s2y
ny
(19)
where s2x and s
2
y are the observed variances of the samples x and y respectively, and
B is a random variable that has a Behrens-Fisher distribution with degrees of freedom
nx − 1 and ny − 1, and with angle parameter equal to tan−1((sx√ny)/(sy√nx)). The
distribution for µx − µy defined by equation (19) is the fiducial distribution for µx − µy
that was advocated by R. A. Fisher for this problem.
5.7. Inference about all parameters of a bivariate normal distribution
The final problem we will consider in this section is that of making inferences about
all the parameters of a bivariate normal distribution, i.e. the two means µx and µy,
the two variances σ2x and σ
2
y and the correlation coefficient ρ, on the basis of a sample
(x, y) = {(xi, yi) : i = 1, 2, . . . , n} from the distribution concerned.
If all parameters except µx are known, a sufficient statistic for µx is
n∑
i=1
xi − ρ
(
σx
σy
) n∑
i=1
yi
which will be treated as being the fiducial statistic in this case. Defining the primary r.v.
Γ as having a N(0, 1) distribution allows equation (2) to be expressed as:
n∑
i=1
xi − ρ
(
σx
σy
) n∑
i=1
yi = ϕ(Γ, µx) = nµx − nρ
(
σx
σy
)
µy + (nσ
2
x(1− ρ2))
1
2 Γ
meaning that the fiducial distribution of µx is defined by
µx |µy, σ2x, σ2y, ρ, (x, y) ∼ N
(
x¯+ ρ
(
σx
σy
)
(µy − y¯), σ
2
x(1− ρ2)
n
)
(20)
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Due to the symmetry of the bivariate normal distribution, if all parameters except µy
are known, the fiducial distribution of µy is defined by
µy |µx, σ2x, σ2y, ρ, (x, y) ∼ N
(
y¯ + ρ
(
σy
σx
)
(µx − x¯),
σ2y(1− ρ2)
n
)
(21)
If all parameters except σ2x are known, then no single sufficient statistic for σ
2
x exists
and therefore, in agreement with Definition 1, we define the fiducial statistic for σ2x to
be the unique maximum likelihood estimator of σ2x, which is obtained by solving the
following quadratic equation for σˆ2x:
n(1− ρ2)σˆ2x + ρ(σˆx/σy)
n∑
i=1
x′iy
′
i = 0 (22)
where x′i = xi − µx and y′i = yi − µy. It is well known that a maximum likelihood
estimator of a parameter is usually asymptotically normally distributed with mean equal
to the true value of the parameter and variance equal to the inverse of Fisher information.
Since it can be shown that Fisher information of the likelihood function in question with
respect to σx is given by
I(σx) =
−n(2− ρ2)
σ2x(1− ρ2)
equation (2) can be approximated by
σˆx =
√
ϕ(Γ, σ2x) = σx + Γσx
(
(1− ρ2)
n(2− ρ2)
) 1
2
where σˆx is the maximum likelihood estimator of σx defined by equation (22) and Γ
is defined as having a N(0, 1) distribution. Solving this equation for σ2x leads to the
following approximate definition of the fiducial distribution for σ2x:
σ2x = σˆ
2
x
(
Γ
(
(1− ρ2)
n(2− ρ2)
) 1
2
+ 1
)−2
(23)
Again due to the symmetry of the bivariate normal distribution, if all parameters except
σ2y are known, the fiducial distribution of σ
2
y is approximately defined by equation (23)
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with σ2x and σˆ
2
x substituted by σ
2
y and σˆ
2
y respectively, where σˆ
2
y is the maximum likelihood
estimator of σ2y.
If all parameters except the correlation coefficient ρ are known, then no single sufficient
statistic for ρ exists and therefore, similar to the case just discussed, we define the fiducial
statistic for ρ to be the unique maximum likelihood estimator of ρ, which is obtained by
solving the following cubic equation for ρˆ:
−nρˆ3 +
(∑n
i=1 x
′
iy
′
i
σxσy
)
ρˆ2 +
(
n−
∑n
i=1(x
′
i)
2
σ2x
−
∑n
i=1(y
′
i)
2
σ2y
)
ρˆ+
∑n
i=1 x
′
iy
′
i
σxσy
= 0
The distribution of this estimator will be approximated in the same way as the distri-
butions of the estimators σˆ2x and σˆ
2
y were approximated. In particular, since it can be
shown that Fisher information of the likelihood function with respect to ρ is given by
I(ρ) =
n(1 + ρ2)
(1− ρ2)2
equation (2) can be approximated by
ρˆ = ϕ(Γ, ρ) = ρ+
(1− ρ2)Γ√
n(1 + ρ2)
(24)
where again Γ ∼ N(0, 1). Under Definition 2, this equation defines the fiducial distribu-
tion for ρ. We observe that if a random value of Γ is substituted into equation (24) then
the value of ρ that solves this equation will be unique and will be a random value of ρ
from its fiducial distribution.
Figure 3 shows the results of running a Gibbs sampler on the basis of the full con-
ditional fiducial distributions for all five parameters of a bivariate normal distribution
defined by equations (20) and (21), equation (23) in terms of both σ2x and σ
2
y , and equa-
tion (24). This figure has been constructed on the basis of one run of 100,000 cycles of
this algorithm using the same criteria as were used to construct Figures 1 and 2, with
the data set (x, y) in question being a random sample of n = 200 values from a bivariate
normal distribution with µx = µy = 0, σ
2
x = σ
2
y = 1 and ρ = 0.8.
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Running the Gibbs sampler from various starting points provided no evidence to sug-
gest that the sampler was failing to converge or was getting trapped in just one mode
of a proper or improper multimodal distribution. Hence, it would seem reasonable to
draw similar conclusions to that which were made in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, and thereby
assume that the full conditional fiducial distributions for the five parameters concerned
determine a joint fiducial distribution for these parameters.
6. Determining the strengths of subjective fiducial probabilities
We will now fulfill the undertaking made at the end of Section 3 and complete the defini-
tion of the fiducial densities that have been derived by drawing some general conclusions
about what should be the strengths that are assigned to the probability values that are
obtained by integrating over these densities.
Using again the terminology proposed in Bowater (2017a), let the reference set R be
the balls in urn reference set defined in Section 3 but with k instead of 20 balls in the urn,
which we will assume are numbered from 1 to k. Observe that if, within the methodology
of this earlier paper, it is quite reasonably assumed that the similarity S between any
given event A and another event is maximised when the other event is also A, then the
event R(λ) defined by equation (1) must have a probability with respect to the set R
that equals λ.
To make a comparison with this event, let us consider the event of the primary r.v. Γ
being less than γ(λ), where γ(λ) is defined by∫ γ(λ)
−∞
fΓ(γ)dγ = λ
and λ is a member of the set Λ defined below equation (1). The probability λ that
would be assigned both to this latter event when we are in step 1 of the data generating
algorithm in Assumption 1, and to the event R(λ) before the ball is drawn out of the
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Figure 3: Gibbs sampling of the joint fiducial distribution of the parameters of a bivariate
normal distribution
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urn, would usually be classified as an objective probability. As a consequence it would
usually be the case that the similarity
S(R(λ), {Γ < γ(λ)}) (25)
is regarded as being very high, and hence, the probability λ of the event {Γ < γ(λ)} is
considered as being very strong.
In the definition of a univariate subjective fiducial distribution, i.e. Definition 2, the
probability of the event {Γ < γ(λ)} is effectively treated as being λ after the data has
been observed. To determine what strength ought to be assigned to this probability,
let us consider a modified version of one of the abstract scenarios that were outlined in
Bowater (2017a).
In particular, suppose that someone, who will be referred to as the selector, randomly
draws a ball out of the urn that is associated with the set R and then, without looking
at the ball, hands it to an assistant. The assistant, by contrast, looks at the ball, but
conceals it from the selector, and then places it under a cup. The selector believes that
the assistant smiled when he looked at the ball.
Under these conditions, the selector is asked to assign a probability to the event of the
number on the ball being less than or equal to kλ, where generally λ can be any given
value in Λ, but it may be helpful to assume that λ is not too close to 0 or 1. Let this
event be denoted as R∗(λ). Finally, we will assume that it was known from the outset
that the aim of this exercise was for the selector to assign a probability to this particular
event.
Clearly in this scenario, a smile by the assistant would in general need to be taken
into account, since it could imply that it is less likely or more likely that the event R∗(λ)
has taken place. However, the selector may feel that, if the assistant had indeed smiled,
he would not have understood the smile’s meaning. For this reason, he may decide that
the probability that the number on the ball is less than or equal to kλ is what it was
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before the ball was drawn out of the urn, i.e. it is λ.
It would seem undeniable that this probability is a subjective probability as it depends
on a subjective judgement regarding the meaning of a supposed smile. However, given
his lack of understanding about this meaning, the selector may feel that the similarity
S(R∗(λ), R(λ)) is very high, and hence that the probability λ of the event R∗(λ) is very
strong or, to put it another way, that this probability can be regarded in a certain sense
as being almost like a physical probability.
In addressing the main issue of what strength should be assigned after the data has
been observed to the probability λ of the event {Γ < γ(λ)}, an analogy can be drawn
between the supposed smile of the assistant in this abstract scenario and the event of
observing the data x. In particular, under the assumptions of Section 4.2, if little or
nothing was known about the parameter θ1 before the data was observed, the event of
observing the data should have little or no meaning in terms of how it should affect the
probability of the event {Γ < γ(λ)}. Therefore, although the similarity in equation (25)
when judged after the data has been observed may be considered as being marginally
less than what it was before the data was observed, it still ought to be considered as
being very high, and hence, the probability λ of the event {Γ < γ(λ)} still ought to be
regarded as being very strong.
Obviously, if there were strong beliefs about θ1 before the data was observed, then it
may be quite clear how observing the data x should affect the probability of the event
{Γ < γ(λ)}. For example, if such beliefs are strong enough so that they can be adequately
summarised by placing a probability distribution over θ1, then the probability of this
event after the data has been observed could be determined by using Bayes’ theorem.
Nevertheless, the fiducial argument is traditionally applied under the assumption that
little or nothing was known about the parameters of interest before the data was observed,
and the present work will not deviate from this tradition.
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Under this assumption and taking into account that the fiducial density of θ1, i.e. the
density f(θ1 |x), is fully defined by the density of the primary r.v. Γ and known constants,
the probability λ of the event {θ1 < θ1(λ)} after the data has been observed, where θ1(λ)
is defined by ∫ θ1(λ)
−∞
f(θ1 |x)dθ1 = λ
and λ is any given member of Λ, ought to be regarded as being a very strong probability,
or in other words, in spite of this probability being a fiducial probability it ought to be
regarded in a certain sense as being almost like a physical probability. If probabilities
derived by integrating univariately over the full conditional density f(θj |θ−j, x) with
respect to the parameter θj are considered as being very strong for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
then since the joint fiducial density of the parameters θ1, θ2, . . . , θk is fully defined by its
full conditional densities, it can be argued that the probabilities derived by integrating
over this joint density ought to be treated as though they are almost equivalent to physical
probabilities.
In conclusion, although the type of fiducial inference outlined in the present paper
is classified as being ‘subjective’, this is in fact simply due to the argument that all
probability statements made about fixed but unknown parameters must be inherently
subjective, rather than due to a need to emphasize how different the fiducial probability
densities that can be derived using this type of inference are from objective probability
densities.
7. Comparing subjective fiducial inference to Bayesian inference
As mentioned in the Introduction, given that in many cases the standard fiducial distri-
bution is equal to the posterior distribution obtained through Bayes’ theorem for a given
choice of the prior distribution, it has become a convention to claim that, to a large
extent, fiducial inference is indistinguishable from Bayesian inference. For this reason, it
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is worth comparing subjective fiducial inference to Bayesian inference. This comparison
will be carried out using the definition of probability upon which the present work is
based, i.e. the definition outlined in Bowater (2017a, 2017b). It is therefore necessary to
apply this definition to the probabilities used in Bayes’ theorem.
The probabilities that enter into Bayes’ theorem are provided by the sampling den-
sity g(x | θ) and the prior density p(θ). Probabilities obtained by integrating over the
sampling density will usually be physical probabilities and therefore, under the impor-
tant assumption that the sampling model actually generated the observed data, these
probabilities can usually be regarded as being very strong. If probabilities obtained by
integrating over the prior density are also very strong, it would seem logical to regard
the probabilities produced by Bayes’ theorem, i.e. those obtained by integrating over the
posterior density p(θ |x), as also being very strong. This would be the case, for example,
if the prior distribution represents the uncertainty concerning the outcome of a well-
understood physical experiment. Similarly, if the prior density is elicited on the basis of
the subjective opinion of one or a number of scholars in the subject area concerned who
have quite detailed knowledge about the relative plausibility of different values for the
parameter θ, then probabilities obtained by integrating over this prior density may well
be regarded as being reasonably strong and, as a result, it is arguable that the posterior
probabilities that correspond to the use of this prior should also be regarded as being
reasonably strong.
However, to make a direct comparison with subjective fiducial inference, it needs to be
assumed that little or nothing was known about θ before the data was observed. If θ is a
single parameter unrestricted on the real line, it is common to try to represent this lack
of knowledge by placing a diffuse symmetric prior density over θ centred at some given
value θ∗(0.5). Assuming that this has been done, let us consider the similarity between
the event R(λ) as specified in Section 6 and the event of θ being less than the value θ∗(λ),
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i.e. the similarity S(R(λ), {θ < θ∗(λ)}), where θ∗(λ) is defined by the expression:∫ θ∗(λ)
−∞
p(θ)dθ = λ
in which p(θ) is the chosen prior density and λ ∈ Λ. Notice that no matter how diffuse
the prior density is chosen to be, this similarity is likely to be regarded as being very low
for any given value of λ. For example, if λ = 0.5 then S(R(λ), {θ < θ∗(λ)}) is effectively
the similarity between the event of drawing a red ball out of an urn that contains an
equal number of red balls and blue balls and the event of θ being less than θ∗(0.5),
which is clearly going to be a very low similarity as the choice of the median θ∗(0.5) is
completely arbitrary. This implies that for any value λ ∈ Λ, the probability λ of the
event {θ < θ∗(λ)} is likely to be regarded as being very weak.
Since posterior probabilities are determined through Bayes’ theorem simply by reweight-
ing prior probabilities, that is by normalising prior probabilities after they have been
multiplied by the likelihood function, it would seem difficult to argue that such probabil-
ities should be considered as being generally stronger than prior probabilities, except of
course if they could be justified in an alternative way, i.e. a non-Bayesian way. Therefore,
if a proper prior density is used to try to represent a lack of knowledge about an unre-
stricted parameter θ before the data is observed, then it could be argued that it would
be difficult to use Bayesian reasoning to make any kind of claim that probabilities not
equalling zero or one that are obtained by integrating over the resulting posterior density
ought to be regarded as being anything other than very weak probabilities. A similar
argument could be presented in the case where the parameter θ is restricted on the real
line.
This is a clear inadequacy of Bayesian inference. Also, notice that the severe crit-
icisms of carrying out Bayesian inference using objective prior distributions that were
highlighted in Section 2 do not apply to subjective fiducial inference. Therefore, a strong
case has been made that subjective fiducial inference is superior to Bayesian inference
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when little or nothing was known about the parameter of interest before the data was
observed.
8. Open issues
In this closing section, we will briefly discuss some open issues concerning subjective
fiducial inference.
As pointed out in Lindley (1958), standard fiducial inference can be incoherent in the
sense that conditioning in the Bayesian way a fiducial distribution corresponding to a
data set x(1) on another independent data set x(2) does not lead to the fiducial distribution
corresponding to the combined data set {x(1), x(2)}. Much has been made of the existence
of this anomaly, however little attention has been given to its practical consequences.
In particular, little research has been done into establishing in what situations fiducial
inference fails to at least approximately satisfy this coherency condition, especially when
either or both of the samples x(1) and x(2) are at least moderately sized.
Furthermore, in cases where there may be a substantial difference between the fidu-
cial distribution corresponding to the data set {x(1), x(2)} and the fiducial distribution
corresponding to the data set x(1) conditioned in the Bayesian way on the data set x(2),
a sensible strategy exists for choosing between these two distributions. In particular,
if the data set x(1) is large enough so that the fiducial distribution that corresponds to
x(1) is considered to be a very strong distribution, according to the criteria given in Sec-
tion 3 and in Bowater (2017b), then it would seem sensible to regard this distribution
conditioned on the data set x(2) as providing the most appropriate inferences about the
parameters of interest on the basis of the data set {x(1), x(2)}. On the other hand, if the
data set x(1) is so small that some doubts exist with regard to classifying the fiducial
distribution that corresponds to x(1) as being a very strong distribution then, in general,
the most appropriate inferences about the parameters concerned could be regarded as
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being provided by the fiducial distribution that corresponds to the combined data set
{x(1), x(2)}.
As was illustrated in Section 5.7, when applying subjective fiducial inference as defined
in the present paper to the univariate case as specified in Section 4.2, it is not necessary
that the fiducial statistic is a sufficient statistic for the unknown parameter θ1, since if
a single sufficient statistic for θ1 does not exist, it can be defined to be any one-to-one
function of a unique maximum likelihood estimator of θ1. This represents a departure
from standard fiducial inference which may have some impact on the issue that has just
been raised, but which nevertheless substantially opens up the range of applications of
the methodology that has been discussed. It is left as an open issue as to whether and by
how much subjective fiducial inference could perform better in some cases if the fiducial
statistic was allowed to be another type of non-sufficient statistic.
Finally we note that, in general, it would appear that subjective fiducial inference is
more computationally demanding than Bayesian inference. However, similar to what has
been seen in recent years in relation to Bayesian inference, it would be expected that
advances with respect to the computational aspects of subjective fiducial inference will
gradually extend its range of applications as well as improving the sophistication of the
kind of numerical approximations upon which it is clearly going to depend.
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